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THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JOSEPH MITCHELL PARSONS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 880102 
Classification Priority No. 1 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of the appeal 
in this matter for the reason that it is an appeal from a 
conviction of a capital felony and sentence of death, to be 
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court under the provisions of 78-2-2 
(3) (h) and 77-35-26 (8), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS IN LOWER COURT 
The Defendant, Joseph Mitchell Parsons, plead guilty in 
the District Court to the capital felony, Criminal Homicide, 
Murder in the First Degree, on September 18, 1987 (R. 79-86). A 
sentencing trial was held before a 12 member jury in Iron County 
from January 25, 1988, through January 29, 1988. The sentencing 
procedure was conducted under the provisions of 77-3-207, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. The jury returned a unanimous 
verdict for death after deliberating approximately 3 1/2 hours 
(T. 1258). The court granted the Defendant additional time 
to present argument in support of a hearing on the applicability 
of the death penalty in the case (T. 1269). On February 17, 
1988, the court imposed the sentence of death by lethal 
intravenous inj ection. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
FIFTH AMENDMENT, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES• 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment 
of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War 
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation. 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
SECTION 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United State, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States, and of the State wherein they reside. No State, 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of laws. 
ARTICLE 1, SECTION 7, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
ARTICLE 1, SECTION 12, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand 
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a 
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by 
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the County or District in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused 
person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or 
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall 
not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband 
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against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy 
for the same offense. 
ARTICLE 1, SECTION 13, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination 
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be waived 
by the accused with the consent of the State, or by indictment, 
with or without such examination and commitment. The formation 
of the grand jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as 
prescribed by the Legislature. 
76-5-202. MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, 
AS AMENDED. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first 
degree if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death 
of another under any of the following circumstances: 
(h) The actor was previously convicted of first or 
second degree murder or of a felony involving the use or threat 
of violence to a person. For the purpose of this paragraph, an 
offense committed in another jurisdiction, which if committed in 
Utah would be punishable as first or second degree murder, is 
deemed first or second degree murder. 
RULE 403, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
RULE 404 (b), UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 
that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as prove of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. 
UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, RULE 3.4 (e). 
In trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not 
reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by 
admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue 
except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion 
as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the 
culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an 
accused. 
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of Criminal 
Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, a capital felony. The 
Defendant plead guilty to Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First 
Degree, a capital felony, specifically pleading guilty to the 
offense specified in 76-5-202 (1) (h) having intentionally or 
knowingly caused the death of another and having previously been 
convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to 
a person (R. 79-86). The Defendant had previously plead guilty 
to the offense of armed robbery which occurred in Las Vegas, 
Nevada, in 1982. Following the entry of the plea of guilty, the 
Defendant elected to have sentencing determined by jury trial. A 
five-day sentencing hearing was held before a jury of 12 persons, 
January 25 to January 29 of 1988. The jury returned a verdict of 
death, and the Fifth District Court imposed sentence accordingly. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the late afternoon of August 30, 1987, the victim, 
Richard L. Ernest, left Southern California in his 1986 Dodge 
Omni vehicle (T. 666) with the intention of moving to the State 
of Colorado (T.662). The Dodge Omni was packed with the victim's 
tools and personal belongings to the extent that the entire rear 
of the vehicle behind the front seats was filled with these items 
(T. 698). The victim was a carpenter, and most of the tools were 
carpenter tools (T. 683-688). The victim picked up the 
Defendant, Joseph Mitchell Parsons, near Barstow, California, on 
the Interstate 15 freeway. Mr. Parsons was hitchhiking at the 
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time (T. 1035). The victim and Mr. Parsons traveled together 
until approximately 2:00 to 3:00 a.m. on the morning of August 
31, 1987 (T. 1040). They stopped at a rest area on Interstate 15 
in northern Iron County known as the Lunt Park Rest Area 
(T. 1040). Both gentlemen used the restroom facilities at 
the rest area and returned to the car to get some sleep (T. 
1041). While the Defendant, Parsons, was sleeping, he felt a 
hand on his leg. Mr. Parsons told the victim to leave him alone 
(T. 1041-1042) . Mr. Parsons felt the hand on his leg again, and 
attempted to leave the car (T. 1042). The victim grabbed 
Mr. Parsons1 left wrist and Mr. Parsons stabbed the victim in the 
chest, inflicting the fatal wound (To 867), at the first blow 
(T. 1042-1043). There was a struggle thereafter (T. 1043-1044) 
in which the victim received a number of other, though non-fatal, 
stab wounds (T. 861-867). The Defendant drove the car 
approximately one mile north of the rest area (T. 1045) and drove 
thereafter 20 feet off of the road surface, left the victim's 
body alongside the road, covering the body with a sleeping bag 
(T. 1045) . The Defendant then went on to Beaver, Utah, 
approximately 5 miles farther north, and pulled off the 1-15 
freeway entering the Dave's Texaco Station at the south 
interchange of Beaver (T. 704). The Defendant changed his 
clothes and washed the blood off of his hands and arms 
(T. 1047). The Defendant then emptied out a substantial portion 
of the tools and other property from the car, dumping them in the 
dumpster at the rear of the station (T. 1048) . The Defendant 
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gassed up the car at the Dave's Texaco Station using the victim's 
credit card and assuming the identity of the victim, claiming 
that he was Richard L. Ernest (T. 1050) . The Defendant then 
drove off to Richfield, Utah, where he again used the Defendant's 
credit card to check into a motel (T. 1052) and buy various items 
at the K Mart in Richfield (T. 1053)• While the Defendant was at 
the K Mart in Richfield, store personnel checked the status of 
the credit card on a large purchase, and received word that the 
credit card was to be picked up (T. 760). The Defendant 
voluntarily gave the credit card to the store personnel and left 
Richfield (T. 763). The Defendant drove east from Interstate 70, 
stopping at the Red Creek Rest Area east of Salina, Utah. Law 
enforcement officials had been alerted to the credit card 
transactions and the Defendant's unusual activities in Beaver, 
Utah (T. 789) . As the Defendant slept at the Red Creek Rest 
Area, he was arrested by a Trooper of the Utah Highway Patrol, 
and taken into custody at that time (T. 791) . 
The Defendant had previously been convicted of armed 
robbery in Las Vegas, Nevada, in early 1983, out of an incident 
arising in November of 1982 (T. 901) . The Defendant had been 
sentenced to the Nevada State Prison system, and spent 
approximately 5 years in that system before being paroled June of 
1987 • The Defendant had absconded from parole August of 1987 
(T. 924), and had traveled in Nevada and California until he met 
the victim on August 30, 1987. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The statute with which the Defendant was charged 
and to which he plead guilty is unconstitutional for the reason 
that it allows the State of Utah to use evidence of a prior 
conviction in order to improperly prejudice the jury and incite 
the jurors to convict on the basis of prior bad acts. This 
statute forced the Defendant to plead guilty because of the ease 
of the State's proof and the fear of a psychological momentum 
building within the jury to favor the death penalty. 
2. By preparing specific findings only on the issues 
of aggravating circumstances, the jury was improperly mislead to 
the conclusion that it only found aggravating circumstances and 
there were no mitigating circumstances to mitigate against the 
imposition of the death penalty. 
3. The Defendant was improperly denied the ability to 
present evidence to the court indicating that the imposition of 
the death penalty in his case at his prosecution for a capital 
crime was arbitrarily and capriciously undertaken by the State of 
Utah. 
4. The trial court improperly intervened in the 
proceedings by assisting the State of Utah and advising the 
State's prosecutor that he should withdraw a Motion for Mistrial 
made on the fourth day of trial. 
5. The trial court improperly allowed the State to 
admit evidence of possession of a firearm by a restricted felon 
in the case where the Defendant was never charged with that 
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offense. Said evidence was admitted in order to improperly 
prejudice the jury and inflame the jury into imposing the death 
penalty. 
6. The jury was improperly influenced by the 
appearance of the Honorable J. Harlan Burns, former Judge of the 
Fifth District Court, and father to the Iron County Attorney when 
Judge Burns appeared during the course of the trial and was 
openly seen to consult with and support the State's prosecutor in 
this trial. 
7. The prosecutor improperly interposed his personal 
opinions in argument to the jury, thereby placing undue emphasis 
on his personal perceptions of the case in violations of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct. 
8. The Defendant was sentenced to death by a jury 
tainted by juror misconduct wherein the juror Mark A. Poulson 
engaged in conversation with one of the witnesses called by the 
State of Utah. 
9. The Defendant was denied due process of law when 
the court refused the Defendant's requested instruction regarding 
two reasonable theories of the evidence, one pointing to 
mitigation, and one pointing to aggravation. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE STATUTE OF WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN CONVICTED, 
AFTER HIS GUILTY PLEA, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
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This Defendant plead guilty to 76-5-202 (1) (h) 
admitting that he knowingly and intentionally caused the death of 
another, after having previously been convicted of a felony 
involving the use or threat or violence to a person. The 
specific felony was an armed robbery in Las Vegas, Nevada, in 
November of 1982. 
It is Parsons1 assertion that the statute is 
unconstitutional in two different respects. First, the statute 
subjects Mr. Parsons to the unconstitutional result of, "for the 
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb11 in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. A similar Utah Constitutional provision states 
"nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense." This appellant acknowledges that the argument may be 
made that this subsection of the capital homicide statute may be 
seen as similar to the habitual criminal statutes that have 
passed constitutional review in the past. STATE V. BAILEY, 712 
P. 2d 281 (Utah, 1986) However, apart from the substantial 
procedural variance between the habitual criminal statute and 
76-5-202 (1) (h), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, the 
appellant urges this Court to rule that by making a homicide, 
after having been convicted of a crime of violence against a 
person, a capital offense, the legislature has created a new 
crime, rather than simply enhancing the punishment of the latest 
offense. The new crime has as its primary element the conviction 
and sentencing on a previous crime of violence. Such a pattern 
9 
seems directly violative of the Utah Constitution's prohibition 
against being "twice put in jeopardy for the same offense" 
(Article 1, Section 12, Constitution of Utah). The like 
provisions within the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, prohibiting any person "for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb", are offended by a statute 
which, because of the elements of the offense, inflict the 
ultimate punishment because of a crime already punished. This is 
a process far removed form the enhancement of punishments on the 
basis of a defendant's new conduct coupled his prior record. The 
scheme of creating a new offense upon the foundation of an old 
one, as in 76-5-202 (1) (h) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, is constitutionally flawed on double jeopardy grounds. 
Mr. Parsons plead guilty to the offense specified in 
76-5-202 (1) (h) for the reason that the State could so easily 
prove him guilty of that offense. There was no question that 
Mr. Parsons was the person who committed the homicide. All of 
the physical evidence, as well as eyewitness identification 
testimony established Mr. Parsons as the individual present at 
the scene of the homicide and in possession of the victim's 
property after the homicide. Furthermore, the State had easy 
access to certified records of the Nevada conviction, and for 
that reason the Defendant determined that it was best to plead 
guilty to the statutory provision that was so easily proven. 
This was a tactical decision reached by the Defendant and his 
counsel under the theory that a psychological momentum would be 
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built up when the jury was presented with the Defendant's record 
in the guilt phase of a trial. The Defendant, of course, 
strenuously objected to the other provisions with which he was 
charged, that being that he committed the homicide for pecuniary 
gain, or that he committed the homicide in the course of a 
robbery. These items were later used by the State as aggravating 
circumstances in the sentencing provisions, along with the 
Defendant's previous conviction. However, the Defendant 
affirmatively asserts that had he not faced the prospect of a 
conviction on an unconstitutional statute, he would never have 
been subjected to the death penalty at the sentencing phase. For 
that reason, the constitutionality of 76-5-202 (1) (h) is a 
threshhold issue in this case. 
The other reason for finding 76-5-202 (1) (h) 
unconstitutional is that it allows the State of Utah to use 
evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible under the 
provisions of Rules 403 and 404 (b) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Rule 403 prohibits the use of relevant evidence that 
may unduly prejudice or confuse or mislead the jury. Rule 404 
(b) states that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person or to show that he 
acted in conformity therewith. It is Mr. Parsons' assertion that 
this use of prior convictions is in direct violation of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence 403 and 404 (b) , and that as such, he was 
denied due process of law by use of the unconstitutional statute. 
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In the case of STATE V, SAUNDERS, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah, 
1985) this Court stated: 
The basis of these limitations on the 
admissibility of evidence of prior crimes is the 
tendency of a fact finder to convict the accused 
because of bad character rather than because he is 
shown to be guilty of the offenses charged. Because of 
this tendency, such evidence is presumed prejudicial 
and, absent a reason for the admission of the evidence 
other than to show criminal disposition, the evidence 
is excluded. 
This reasoning is, of course, grounded upon the constitutional 
right of an accused to receive a fair trial by an impartial jury 
with all of the due process of law to which he is entitled. The 
requirements of due process have consistently refuted attempts to 
convict a defendant on the basis of his status rather than his 
acts. rUNITED STATES V. FOSKEY, 636 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 
GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS V. TOTO, 529 F.2d 278 (3rd 
Cir. 1976); UNITED STATES V. DANIELS, 770 F.2d 1111 
(D.C. Cir. 1976); UNITED STATES V. COOK, 538 F.2d 1000 (3rd 
Cir. 1976)] 
II 
THE JURY, BY VIRTUE OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, WAS IMPROPERLY MISLEAD TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IT 
COULD FIND ONLY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND NO MITIGATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES IN DETERMINING THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY. 
The jury was given specific findings by the court with 
regard to the aggravating circumstances present in the case. The 
jury, however, was only generally instructed regarding the 
mitigating circumstances in the case (R. 267). The result of 
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specific findings versus general instructions made it possible 
for the jury to come to only one conclusion, and that is that the 
aggravating circumstances, which had been specifically found 
by the jury, outweighed any mitigating circumstances for which 
there was no specific finding or special verdict form. The fact 
that the jury was out less than four hours in this case would 
indicate that the structure of the jury verdicts themselves had 
easily mislead the jury to the conclusion that there were only 
aggravating circumstances present. 
There is no requirement within 76-3-207, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, that a jury be given special 
verdicts as to either aggravation or mitigation. The holding in 
STATE V. WOOD, 648 P. 2d 71 (Utah, 1981) included an admonition 
that the sentencing authority consider aggravating and mitigating 
factors not in terms of relative numbers, but in terms of their 
respective substantiality and persuasiveness. Instruction No. 12 
in this case (R. 2 65) contained this language. However, the 
special verdicts which related solely to the aggravating factors, 
gave the impression not only of the importance of these factors 
in terms of numbers, but also in terms of substantiality and 
persuasiveness. If the jury should not consider the aggravating 
factors as substantial and persuasive, then why would the trial 
court ask the jury for special findings on the aggravating 
factors and ignore the mitigating ones? In general the law is 
opposed to special verdicts in criminal cases [76 AM. JUR. 2d 
TRIAL Sec. 1178; STATE V BOCK, 328 P.2d 1065 (Idaho)]. This 
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appellant would urge the Court to adopt a rule that would require 
either no special verdicts in capital sentencing proceedings or 
at least a balance of potential special verdicts to be 
considered. 
Ill 
THE DEFENDANT WAS IMPROPERLY DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY TO 
PRESENT EVIDENCE TO THE COURT THAT HE WAS BEING CHARGED WITH A 
FIRST DEGREE MURDER CASE IN AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER. 
It is Mr. Parsons1 assertion that in his particular 
case the only reason he was charged with First Degree Murder 
instead of Second Degree Murder was because of the arbitrary and 
capricious decision of the State of Utah to charge his as a 
capital case when others were not so charged. The undersigned 
counsel for Mr. Parsons has been in practice in the Southern Utah 
area for 13 years. Of that 13 years, the undersigned spent 4 
years as the Iron County Attorney and the remaining time as a 
member of the criminal defense bar. In that 13 years period, the 
undersigned has found that only Mr. Parsons, of all of the 
homicide cases in the Southern Utah area where the defendant was 
the actual perpetrator of the offense, was faced with the death 
penalty. Only one other case, State v. Norman Lee Newstead, was 
fully tried, both in the guilt and penalty phases, and 
Mr. Newstead did not receive the death penalty. In all other 
approximately 8 homicide cases that arguably could have been 
tried as First Degree Murder cases, the Defendant faced only 
Second Degree Murder charges. However, Mr. Parsons was 
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prohibited the ability to even make a record regarding this 
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty in his case. 
In the trial court the State asserted, and the court 
agreed, that the Appellant's request to hold a hearing to present 
and preserve evidence regarding the charging and prosecution of 
other capital cases in the Southern Utah area in the last ten 
years amounted to a "proportionality" hearing of the type denied 
in PULLY V, HARRIS, 465 U.S. 37 (1984). However, the appellant 
re-asserts his claim that he is entitled to examine the 
application of the death penalty, at least in Southern Utah, at 
the trial court, in order to support his claim that the death 
penalty has been "wantonly or freakishly" imposed. (See PULLY, 
supra.) 
IV 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY INTERVENED IN THE PROCEEDING 
BY ASSISTING THE STATE WHEN THE COUNTY ATTORNEY MADE A MOTION FOR 
MISTRIAL. 
On the fourth day of trial at the matter, after the 
testimony of Dr. Robert Howell, the County Attorney moved the 
court for a mistrial. The court advised the County Attorney that 
should he move for a mistrial at that stage in the proceedings, 
that he could never bring the matter back for trial should the 
Motion be granted. After the court's admonition, the County 
Attorney then withdrew that Motion and the matter proceeded 
forward. It is Mr. Parsons1 position that the trial court 
improperly instructed the County Attorney's office at this 
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point. The transcript, at Pages 1168 through 1169, reads as 
follows: 
THE COURT: All right. The members of the jury 
have now left the room. 
Mr. Burns. 
MR. BURNS: Yes, Your Honor. The State at this 
time would like to move for a mistrial based upon — 
THE COURT: Mr. Burns, are you — you want to move 
for a mistrial? 
MR. BURNS: I want to move for a mistrial on the 
following basis. 
THE COURT: May I speak to you at the bench a 
minute, please. 
(Whereupon, a discussion was had among court and 
counsel at the bench, which was reported as 
follows:) 
THE COURT: The law says that if you move for a 
mistrial, that that invokes the double jeopardy 
standard, and he can't be retried. 
MR. BURNS: Well, if I move for a mistrial — I 
have a right to move for a mistrial if I want to if 
defense counsel misrepresents something. 
I have the right to have a psychologist here 
present, and I don't because — 
THE COURT: Well, you should have raised it before 
now. You should have had your psychologist here. 
MR. BURNS: I have raised it. I'll make my 
record. 
THE COURT: I wouldn't move for a mistrial. 
(Whereupon, the following proceedings were had in 
open court, outside the hearing and the presence 
of the jury.) 
MR. BURNS: Based upon the court's feeling with 
respect to the bodies of law in the State of Utah and 
the State moving for a mistrial, I'll withdraw that. 
16 
Following this interchange, the State complained about 
the substance of Dr. Howell's testimony and the earlier 
conversation had in chambers on the second day of trial regarding 
the issue of whether or not Dr. Howell would be called by the 
defense. The court, after having reviewed the record, determined 
that the County Attorney had been advised as to the substance of 
Dr. Howell's testimony and that no misrepresentations were made 
between what the County Attorney had been told and what 
Dr. Howell had testified. It was apparent to the writer of this 
brief (who was also defense counsel at trial) that following 
Dr. Howell's testimony the County Attorney became very concerned 
about the substance of that testimony and the effect that it 
might have had upon the jury. The County Attorney at that time 
determined that he would move for a mistrial, which motion, if 
granted, would have had the effect of imposing a sentence of life 
imprisonment upon the Defendant. 
It is the position of the Defendant that the court 
improperly intervened in behalf of the State of Utah at this time 
and gave the County Attorney advice from the bench to which the 
County Attorney was not entitled. It is difficult for this 
Defendant to see this action by the court as harmless error, 
since if the court had not advised the County Attorney to 
withdraw the motion for mistrial, Mr. Parsons would have received 
a sentence of life imprisonment. 
This writer has been unable to locate any Utah case law 
or statutory authority on this point, but it would seem that the 
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Appellant should be entitled to a proceeding where the prosecutor 
is not coached by the presiding judge. 
V 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOWED THE STATE TO ADMIT 
EVIDENCE OF ANOTHER INFLAMMATORY CRIME OF WHICH THE DEFENDANT WAS 
NEVER CHARGED. 
The trial court in construing this courtfs ruling in 
STATE V. LAFFERTY, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah, 1988), allowed the State 
to present evidence of a non-violent crime for which the 
Defendant had not been charged and of which the Defendant had not 
been convicted. The court did require that the jury find the 
evidence of this crime beyond a reasonable doubt, but the trial 
court misconstrued LAFFERTY to say that the State could use 
evidence of any crime uncharged and unproven so long as the jury 
was instructed beyond a reasonable doubt. LAFFERTY does not 
extend that far and this Defendant is unduly prejudiced by such 
an extension. 
This Defendant is also prejudiced by this practice 
advocated in LAFFERTY in violation of Section 13 of Article I of 
the Utah State Constitution. This provision of the Utah State 
Constitution requires that the Defendant be prosecuted by 
"information after examination and commitment by a magistrate". 
This Defendant was denied this opportunity when this evidence was 
first presented at the sentencing phase of his prosecution for a 
capital homicide charge. The Defendant was also denied his right 
under Section 12 of Article I of the Utah Constitution to have a 
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copy of the accusation against him, and his right under Section 7 
of Article I of the Utah State Constitution to have due process 
of law. The Court's attention is drawn to the dissenting opinion 
by Associate Chief Justice Stewart in STATE V. LAFFERTY stating 
"I believe the better course is to completely exclude evidence of 
crimes for which there is no conviction." 
VI 
THE JURY WAS IMPROPERLY INFLUENCED BY THE APPEARANCE OF 
THE HONORABLE J. HARLAN BURNS, FORMER JUDGE OF THE FIFTH DISTRICT 
COURT AND FATHER TO THE IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY, WHEN JUDGE BURNS 
APPEARED IN OPEN COURT DURING THE COURSE OF THE TRIAL AND WAS 
SEEN TO CONSULT WITH AND ADVISE THE STATE'S PROSECUTOR IN THIS 
ACTION. 
The foreman of this jury, Mr. Clemont B. Adams, was 
formerly the principal of the South Elementary School in Cedar 
City, Utah (T. 21) . By unusual happenstance, Mr. Adams was 
principal of the South Elementary School when the writer of this 
brief and the Iron County Attorney, Scott M. Burns, both attended 
that school. These facts are not in the record, but they are 
represented to the Court by the writer of this brief, as an 
officer of this Court, to be true. The undersigned was also 
present in the Fifth District Court of Iron County when the 
Honorable J. Harlan Burns presided in that Court. Mr. Clemont 
B. Adams appeared as a witness in another matter. The 
undersigned was present when Judge Burns complimented Mr. Adams 
for his having been able to preside over a school in which all 
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four of Judge Burns1 sons had attended. Judge Burns retired from 
the bench in January of 1987, but still remained a respected 
member of the Cedar City community and the Southern Utah area. 
He appeared during the trial in this matter and sat in the 
courtroom watching the proceedings for a short period of time, 
perhaps one to two hours. The presence of Judge Burns was 
acknowledged by Judge Eves on the record (T. 1060). This 
is such an extraordinary circumstance that the undersigned is 
unaware of, and has been unable to find, any parallel cases where 
the former Judge of a court, and also the father of the 
prosecutor, appeared in court, obviously with interest in his 
son's work and seemingly in an advisory capacity. This is 
additionally unusual in that the foreman of the jury was a school 
principal of both the prosecutor and the defense counsel, and 
well-acquainted with both attorneys, as well as the former 
District Judge. The writer of this brief is aware of no specific 
instance of prejudice against this Defendant or bias in favor 
of the State because of the presence of Judge Burns in this 
trial. However, the circumstances are so extraordinary and the 
gravity of this case so extreme, that this writer feels it 
necessary to point out this occurrence to this reviewing Court. 
VII 
THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY IMPLIED PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF 
THE FACTS IN ISSUE BY PLACING UNDUE EMPHASIS ON HIS 
INTERPRETATION OF THE EVIDENCE. 
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In closing argument, the County Attorney was arguing 
that the victim was not a homosexual and that the Defendant's 
story of having his leg touched by the victim was not 
believable. At that point, the County Attorney said: 
Let's just say for the sake of argument — let's 
throw all that out. Let's say he did. I don't think 
you believe that, and I don't think you'll find that, 
but let's just say — 
MR. SHUMATE: Your Honor, I must object at this 
point. The counsel is referring to his own opinion and 
what he thinks happened in the matter. It is improper 
under Rule 3.4 of the Rules of — 
THE COURT: I think he was drawing a permissible 
deduction from the evidence. (T. 1219) 
The writer of this brief understands that both sides 
have considerable latitude in their closing arguments and that 
they are entitled to draw fair deductions and inferences from the 
evidence. (STATE V. LAFFERTY, supra.) However, a prosecutor 
steps across that line of drawing reasonable deductions into the 
prohibited area of asserting personal knowledge when he says "I 
don't think you'll find that". Such a statement gives unsworn, 
unchecked testimony and exploits the influence of the 
Prosecutor's office, in exactly the fashion decried in the ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice, Section 3-5.8 (2d Ed. 1980). 
[Also see Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.4 (e)] 
VIII 
THE DEFENDANT WAS SENTENCED TO DEATH BY A JURY, ONE OF 
WHOSE MEMBERS HAD SPOKEN WITH ONE OF THE STATE'S WITNESSES IN THE 
FOYER OF THE COURTROOM DURING THE COURSE OF THE TRIAL. 
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The transcript of the proceedings from Page 814 through 
Page 823 relates the occurrences between Mr. Slater, the State's 
witness, and Mark Andrew Poulson. The time of the conversation, 
was Wednesday, January 27, 1988, between 8:30 and 9:00 a.m. The 
Defendant felt comfortable with Mr. Poulson seated on the jury 
and felt comfortable with Mr. Poulson's relation of his 
conversation with Mr. Slater. The Defendant specifically waived 
any prejudice resulting from the conversation between 
juror Poulson and the witness, Slater. (T. 823) However, at the 
return of a verdict for the death penalty, the Defendant must 
conclude that the contact between the witness and the juror was 
prejudicial. The standard for review in capital cases is that 
this court will review errors raised on appeal even if no proper 
objection was made at trial, but will reverse a conviction based 
on such errors only if they are manifest and prejudicial, fSTATE 
V. LAFFERTY 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah, 1988)] The court, of course, 
must determine whether or not the error was prejudicial, and in 
making that determination must find that there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the Defendant. In 
this case, where the jury considered three days of testimony and 
over 100 exhibits and arrived at a verdict imposing the death 
penalty after only three and one-half hours, there would appear 
to be a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
Defendant absent the error. 
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IX 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY, 
AS DEFENDANT REQUESTED, ON THE TWO REASONABLE HYPOTHESES THEORY. 
The Defendant submitted to the trial court a request 
jury instruction asking the jury to be instructed that if they 
could view the evidence in two reasonable interpretations, one in 
favor of aggravation, and the other in favor of mitigation, that 
they are required to adopt the mitigating interpretation 
(R. 211-212). The court refused to give such an instruction and 
rested its decision on earlier cases in the State of Utah denying 
such instructions in guilt or innocence phases of felony trials 
(T. 1198). The case of STATE V. LAROCCO, 664 P.2d 1272 (Utah, 
1982) , was relied upon by the court in determining that the two 
reasonable hypotheses instruction is given within the discretion 
of the court and is not even required in cases where evidence is 
solely circumstantial. However, in cases such as this, where the 
death penalty is imposed and the circumstance of the death are 
essential to the determination by the jury of the character of 
the accused in determining penalty, the two reasonable hypotheses 
instruction should be mandated in order to give the jury guidance 
in the interpretation of physical evidence which can only be 
deemed as circumstantial. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant's sentence to death should be overturned 
and the court should follow the legislative mandate in 76-3-207 
(5), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and order that the 
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court sentence the Defendant to life imprisonment. In the 
alternative, the court should allow the Defendant to withdraw his 
plea of guilty to the unconstitutional statute and remand the 
matter for new trial in the District Court. 
DATED this </ day of August, 1988 
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